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Abstract
Continuous variable one-way and controlled-two-way secure direct quantum communication schemes have been designed
using Gaussian states. Specifically, a scheme for continuous variable quantum secure direct communication and another
scheme for continuous variable controlled quantum dialogue are proposed using single-mode squeezed coherent states. The
security of the proposed schemes against a set of attacks (e.g., Gaussian quantum cloning machine and intercept resend
attacks) has been proved. Further, it is established that the proposed schemes do not require two-mode squeezed states which
are essential for a set of existing proposals. The controlled two-way communication scheme is shown to be very general in
nature as it can be reduced to schemes for various relatively simpler cryptographic tasks like controlled deterministic secure
communication, quantum dialogue, quantum key distribution. In addition, it is briefly discussed that the proposed schemes
can provide us tools to design quantum cryptographic solutions for several socioeconomic problems.
1 Introduction
The advantages of quantum resources and principles of quantum mechanics in the field of quantum technology are the focus
of the second quantum revolution [1]. The first set of applications of quantum mechanics was proposed in secure quantum
communication with the feasibility of a quantum key distribution protocol [2], where security does not rely on the complexity
of the computational task. This was followed by several quantum key distribution and other cryptographic schemes (see [3–5]
for review). Specifically, quantum resources ensure secure transmission of a message without requiring key transmission
known as quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [6–8] and deterministic secure quantum communication (DSQC) [9].
DSQC (QSDC) requires an (no) additional classical communication to decode the message [4,9]. Bidirectional and controlled
variants of these schemes have been proposed subsequently [10, 11].
Independent of these initial discrete variable (DV) quantum cryptography schemes, a set of continuous variable (CV)
secure quantum communication schemes have also been proposed. Information is encoded on quadratures in CV communica-
tion schemes. The encoded information is decoded later by homodyne or heterodyne detection (see [12–14] for review). Most
of the initial CV cryptography schemes used Gaussian states, like squeezed [15,16], Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlated [17],
and coherent [18–20] states. However, schemes using non-Gaussian states have also been proposed since then ( [21] and
references therein). CV quantum communication is preferred over corresponding DV counterpart due to the possibility of its
implementation without requiring single photon source and/or detector, better performance for metropolitan networks which
can be performed using existing optical communication technology.
Motivated by the advantages of CV communication in general, CV schemes are proposed recently for QSDC [22, 23],
DSQC [24], quantum dialogue (QD) [25, 26], multiparty QD [22, 27, 28], controlled quantum dialogue (CQD) [29]. Several
types of CV quantum key distribution schemes have also been designed ( [21] and references therein). Inspired by these works
and our recent results [29–34] which established that several direct quantum communication schemes may be useful in pro-
viding quantum solutions to secure multiparty computation tasks [35], here we propose a CV QSDC and a CV CQD schemes.
Specifically, it is already established that several socioeconomic problems can be defined as secure multiparty computation
tasks, such as voting [30], sealed-bid auction [32], socialist millionaire problem [29], and private comparison [33]. In fact,
some of the present authors have proposed a CV CQD scheme using two-mode squeezed state [29] and used it as primitive
for quantum solution for the socialist millionaire problem. Squeezed and entangled states for quantum communication may
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Figure 1: (Color online) Wigner function of a (a) coherent state |α〉 and (b) squeezed coherent state S(s)|α〉 with s = e0.3i
with α = 1.2 + i2.1. These plot are generated using [45].
be generated in different systems and optical processes [36–42]. These works and the fact that single-mode Gaussian states
are easy to prepare, justify the need for designing new schemes for secure direct quantum communication using these states.
In the rest of the paper, we have tried to design such schemes using squeezed coherent states.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some basic concepts of quantum optics required
to explain the CV QSDC and CV CQD schemes (given in Section 3). In Section 4, we analyze the security of the proposed
protocols. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Coherent states |α〉 of the radiation field are the eigenstates of the annihilation operator aˆ with a complex eigenvalue α, also
called the amplitude of |α〉. A coherent state can also be described in terms of the displacement operator D(α) as [43]
|α〉 = D(α)|0〉 = eαaˆ†−α∗aˆ|0〉. (1)
Interestingly, the displacement operator acting on a coherent state would give another coherent state [43]
D(β)|α〉 = |β + α〉. (2)
Further, an arbitrary quantum state ρ can also be described by a quasiprobability distribution in phase space, such as
Wigner function [44]
W (γ) =
1
pi2
∫
d2z Tr [ρD(z)] e−(zγ
∗−z∗γ). (3)
It can be easily verified that the Wigner function of a coherent state |α〉 is obtained as a Gaussian distribution peaked at γ = α
(cf. Fig. 1 (a)).
The real part q and the imaginary part p of the eigenvalue α = q + ip give values for the position and momentum quadra-
tures, respectively. These quadratures can be measured by two methods, namely by homodyne and heterodyne detection.
These methods are useful in quantum optical tomography, too [46, 47]. Homodyne detection is used to measure one of
the quadratures, whereas heterodyne detection helps in measuring both the quadratures. However, Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle restrict precise measurement of both the quadratures in heterodyne measurement.
Additionally, the squeezing operator is defined as
S(s) = e
1
2 (s
∗aˆ2−saˆ†2), (4)
where squeezing parameter s = reiθ. A coherent state gets squeezed after application of the squeezing operator which
reduces the variance along one direction depending upon squeezing phase parameter at the cost of increase in variance in the
perpendicular direction (cf. Fig. 1 (b)). Therefore, α cannot be determined accurately using homodyne/heterodyne detection
in the absence of knowledge about s. Note that the squeezing and displacement operators do not commute, and thus
S(s)D(α) = D(β)S(s), (5)
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Figure 2: (Color online) Schematic diagram of the QSDC protocol.
where
β = α cosh(r) + eiθα∗sinh(r) (6)
and
α = β cosh(r)− eiθβ∗sinh(r). (7)
This brief description of the preliminaries enables us to propose the protocols for CV QSDC and CV CQD that we aim to
design in this work. The next section describes the protocols.
3 The protocols
Before we describe the cryptographic schemes, we briefly discuss the encoding scheme. The encoding scheme is as follows:
The real line is divided into 8 parts: (-∞, -3), (−3,−2) , . . . , (i, i+ 1) , . . . , (2, 3) , and (3, ∞). These parts represent the
binary numbers 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110 and 111, respectively [25, 29]. The message is encoded by choosing a
random real number r from the corresponding interval and applying the displacement operator D(β) on the incoming state
where β = r + ir. Here it may be noted that the sender need not know which quadrature is squeezed. Consequently, she/he
should encode the same message on both the quadratures.
3.1 Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol
The QSDC protocol (shown schematically in Fig. 2) works as follows
1. Bob generates n random complex numbers in a string Rd and labels them α1, α2, ....., αn. He then randomly chooses
n more complex numbers s1, s2, ...., sn in a string Rs. He subsequently uses both these strings Rd and Rs to prepare
the squeezed coherent states S(sj)D(αj)|0〉 ∀j ∈ (1, . . . n), and sends them to Alice via block transmission.
2. Alice uses an optical switch to randomly select a set of the incoming states as control/message mode, and sends the
information about the coordinates of the n/2 control mode states to Bob, whereas she puts the message mode states into
an optical delay.
Here and in what follows, by coordinates we mean the time slot chosen by Bob as control/message modes.
3. Bob sends information of sj and αj for the control mode states to Alice. She applies S†(sj) = S(−sj) on the
corresponding control mode states, and performs homodyne measurement in the position/momentum quadrature and
verifies the real/imaginary part of the corresponding values of αj to check for eavesdropping. If measured αj values are
correct up to a tolerable limit, then she continues to Step 4, else she discards the protocol, and they start all over again.
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Figure 3: (Color online) Schematic diagram of the CQD protocol.
4. After discarding the control mode states, Alice randomly chooses n/4 states from the message mode and encodes her
message on them by applying D(β), where β = mA (1 + i) depends on her message mA ∈ R. The remaining n/4
states are kept unchanged to be used as decoy states, and all these n/2 states are then sent to Bob.
5. Bob applies the corresponding S†(sj) operator and performs homodyne measurement on the incoming n/2 message
mode states for the corresponding position or momentum quadrature.
6. Alice sends information about the coordinates of the decoy states to Bob, and he checks for eavesdropping by comparing
the corresponding αj values for the decoy states by following the same procedure as described in Step 3.
7. The measurement results from the remaining message mode states would reveal the message mA and hence Bob would
obtain the message sent by Alice using Eq. (7).
3.2 Controlled quantum dialogue (CQD) protocol
The CQD protocol (shown schematically in Fig. 3) works as follows
1. Charlie generates 4n random complex numbers as a string Rd and labels them γ1, γ2, ...., γ4n. He then randomly
generates 4n more complex numbers s1, s2, ...., s4n as a string Rs and uses both Rd and Rs to prepare the squeezed
coherent states S(sj)D(γj)|0〉 ∀j ∈ (1, . . . 4n) and sends them to Alice.
2. Alice, using an optical switch, randomly selects 2n of the incoming states as the control mode and sends the information
about the coordinates (i.e., corresponding time slots) of the 2n control mode states to Charlie, while she puts the rest of
the 2n states into an optical delay for the message mode.
3. Charlie sends values of γj and sj of the control mode states to Alice, and she applies the corresponding squeezing op-
erator S†(sj) = S(−sj) to each of the control mode states to perform homodyne measurement of position/momentum
quadrature on them. From the measured values she verifies the corresponding value γj chosen by Charlie to check for
eavesdropping. If γj values are correct up to a tolerable limit, then she continues to the next step, else the protocol is
aborted and they start all over again.
4. After discarding the control mode states, Alice encodes her message mA randomly in n of her message mode states by
applying the appropriate displacement operator D(αj) with αj = mA + i mA on them and leaves the other n states
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as control mode. Subsequently, she chooses a random complex number wj and squeezes all the 2n states by applying
S(wj) to these states and sends them to Bob. Upon Bob’s confirmation of receiving all the 2n states, Alice sends Bob
the value of wj and the coordinates of the control mode states and Charlie sends Bob their corresponding γj and sj .
Without loss of generality, we can assume wj = w ∀j for squeezing operations would be sufficient in providing security
against participant attack by Charlie.
5. Bob first applies the squeezing operator S†(wj) = S(−wj) on all the 2n received states and then applies the correspond-
ing squeezing operators S†(sj) on the n control mode states and checks for eavesdropping just as Step 3, meanwhile he
encodes his message mB in the other n message modes by applying the appropriate displacement operator D(βj) with
βj = mB + imB on them.
6. Once Bob encodes the message in the message mode states and confirms that there is no eavesdropping, then Charlie
sends the corresponding γj and sj of the message mode states, and Bob applies the corresponding operatorD†(γj)S†(sj)
on the message mode states. He measures position/momentum quadrature using homodyne detection and announces
αj + βj after calculating it using Eq. (7).
Finally, Alice and Bob can obtain each other’s message by subtracting their message from the announced value of
αj + βj .
We have proposed here CV protocols for QSDC and CQD, both of which are the schemes for secure direct quantum commu-
nication, but the former one enables one way secure direct communication whereas the latter one allows the users to perform
a two-way secure communication in presence of a controller. Notice from the schematic diagrams of these schemes in Figs. 2
and 3 that if the task allotted to Charlie in CQD is performed by Bob and he does not encode his message as displacement op-
eratorD (β) the scheme is equivalent to the QSDC scheme. This reduction can be summarized as feasibility of a less complex
cryptographic task if a secure communication solution is available for more complex problem. Analogously, the feasibility
a of CQD scheme also provides corresponding quantum schemes for controlled DSQC, QD, DSQC as well as quantum key
distribution and agreement (see [48] for more detail).
Interestingly, some of the schemes for secure direct quantum communication can be used as a primitive to obtain solution
of secure multiparty computation problems, which have significance in several socioeconomic tasks. For instance, consider
that Alice and Bob wish to compare their assets to know the richer one among them, which is known as socialist millionaire
problem [29]. They can perform CQD scheme where both Alice and Bob would encode the amount of assets they have and
send the encoded mode finally to Charlie for measurement. Assuming that Alice (Bob) always encodes A (−B) for her (his)
amount of assets A (B). Depending upon whether Charlie’s homodyne measurement finally gives him positive (negative)
value, they can conclude Alice (Bob) the richer person as A > B (B > A). Recently, we have used two-mode squeezed
state based CQD scheme to provide solutions for the socialist millionaire problem [29]. Further, these schemes ensure the
feasibility of quantum solutions for e-commerce [34] and voting [30] as well. In what follows, the security of the QSDC and
CQD schemes against various types of attacks will be critically analyzed.
4 Security analysis of the protocols
In this section, we discuss the security of the protocol with respect to two attacks, namely the Gaussian quantum cloning
machine (GQCM) and intercept-resend attacks.
4.1 Gaussian quantum cloning machine (GQCM) attack
A GQCM consists of a linear amplifier (LA) of gain A and a beamsplitter of transmission coefficient T (shown schematically
in Fig. 4). The outputs of the GQCM are given in the Heisenberg picture as [26]
aB =
√
ATain +
√
(A− 1)Tb1 +
√
1− Tb2 (8)
and
aE =
√
Tb2 −
√
A(1− T )ain −
√
(A− 1)(1− T )b1, (9)
where aB and aE are Bob’s and Eve’s copies, respectively. Further, ain is the incoming Alice’s signal mode, and b1 and b2
are vacuum modes as inputs of the linear amplifier and the beamsplitter, respectively. We discuss the GQCM attack for the
two protocols separately.
4.1.1 QSDC protocol
In the QSDC protocol given in Fig. 1, the squeezing parameters sj and the initial coherent amplitudes αj are completely
randomized and are kept secret by Bob throughout the protocol. Therefore, Eve cannot infer anything from her copy of the
cloned state. Hence, the QSDC protocol is unconditionally secure against the GQCM attack.
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Figure 4: (Color online) Schematic diagram of the Gaussian quantum cloning machine (GQCM) attack on the CQD protocol.
Here, LA and BS correspond to linear amplifier and beamsplitter, respectively.
4.1.2 CQD protocol
In the first quantum channel from Charlie to Alice, Eve has no advantage by performing this attack as Alice has not yet
encoded her message. However though, in the quantum channel from Alice to Bob, Eve can use the GQCM on the channel
and clone the incoming state, keep her copy of the clone in a quantum memory, wait for the values of wj , sj, αj + βj , and γj
to be announced during the protocol. She, subsequently, using this information, can measure her mode and interpret Alice’s
message which will reveal Bob’s message too. Similarly, an untrusted Charlie may also perform the exact same attack.
The input of the GQCM can be defined in Heisenberg picture as
ain = S
†(tj)D†(dj)aD(dj)S(tj) = S†(tj)aS(tj) + dj , (10)
where a = Xa + iPa is the annihilation operator for the CV mode used for message transmission. Here, Xa and Pa
correspond to the conjugate position and momentum quadrature operators, respectively. The final form of displacement and
squeezing operators can be defined in terms of Alice’s and Charlie’s operations D(dj)S(tj) = S(w)D(αj)S(sj)D(γj),
where tj = sj + wj = geih, and dj = djx + idjy can be obtained from αj and γj using Eqs. (6) and (7).
The use of Bogoliubov transformations yields
ain = (mXa + djx) + i(nPa + djy) = Xin + iPin, (11)
where
Xin = mrXa − niPa + djx,
Pin = miXa + nrPa + djy
with
m = cosh(g)− eihsinh(g) = mr + imi,
n = cosh(g) + eiha†sinh(g) = nr + ini.
Using Eq. (11) as the input of Eqs. (8) and (9), the position and momentum quadratures of the Bob’s and Eve’s modes can
be obtained as
XB =
√
AT (mrXa − niPa + djx) +
√
(A− 1)TXb1 +
√
1− TXb2 ,
XE =
√
TXb2 −
√
A(1− T )(mrXa − niPa + djx)−
√
(A− 1)(1− T )Xb1 ,
PB =
√
AT (miXa + nrPa + djy) +
√
(A− 1)TPb1 +
√
1− TPb2 ,
PE =
√
TPb2 −
√
A(1− T )(miXa + nrPa + djy)−
√
(A− 1)(1− T )Pb1 .
(12)
Since these variables are normally distributed, their corresponding variances are
〈(∆XB)2〉 = MXB +NXB ,
〈(∆XE)2〉 = MXE +NXE ,
〈(∆PB)2〉 = MPB +NPB ,
〈(∆PE)2〉 = MPE +NPE ,
(13)
where the parameters
MXB = MPB =
1
4AT,
MXE = MPE =
1
4A(1− T )
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Figure 5: (Color online) Variation of (a) ∆IX and (b) ∆IP with transmission coefficient T for different values of squeezing
parameter g, while values of squeezing parameter h and linear amplifier gain A are mentioned.
are the respective signal variances, and
NXB =
1
4 ((m
2
r + n
2
i )AT + (A− 1)T + (1− T )),
NXE =
1
4 (T + (m
2
r + n
2
i )A(1− T ) + (A− 1)(1− T )),
NPB =
1
4 ((m
2
i + n
2
r)AT + (A− 1)T + (1− T )),
NPE =
1
4 (T + (m
2
i + n
2
r)A(1− T ) + (A− 1)(1− T ))
are the respective noise variances.
If γj is real (imaginary), then the position (momentum) quadrature is used for Homodyne measurement. Therefore, the
mutual information IJ(A,B) between Alice and Bob and IJ(A,E) between Alice and Eve can be calculated as
IJ(A,B) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
MJB
NJB
)
, (14)
and
IJ(A,E) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
MJE
NJE
)
(15)
with J ∈ {X,P} corresponding to the position and momentum quadrature measurements. The security criterion for the CQD
protocol is
∆IJ = IJ(A,B)− IJ(A,E) > 0. (16)
We further discuss the dependence of the security of the protocol on different parameters, such as squeezing parameters and
cloning parameters (shown in Figs. 5-8). According to Fig. 5, we can clearly see that for ∆IJ > 0 requires the transmission
coefficient T > 0.5, and we also see that both ∆IX and ∆IP increases with an increase in T . Additionally, for T > 0.5,
∆IJ decreases with increase in the gain parameter A as shown in Fig. 6. In the case of T > 0.5, both ∆IX and ∆IP initially
increase with increase in the value of squeezing parameter g and then decrease after reaching a maximum value of ∆IJ . The
effect of squeezing parameter g on position and momentum quadratures is opposite as ∆IP can be obtained from ∆IX by
considering −g instead of g (cf. Figs. 7 and 8). We have used h in the range 0 to pi because according to Fig. 8, the results
are symmetric about h = pi.
4.2 Intercept-resend attack
In the QSDC protocol, Eve keeps the incoming state from Bob by using delay, and she prepares and sends her own freshly
prepared state to Alice. Alice encodes her message on Eve’s state and sends it to Bob. Eve decodes the message from this state,
encodes the same message on Bob’s state in the quantum memory and sends it back to Bob. This attack cannot be performed
in this protocol because Eve will be detected when Alice checks for eavesdropping on the control mode, as αj values of
those sent by Bob and those measured by Eve will not match. Another type of intercept-resend attack (which is a form of
7
A
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
∆
 
I X
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
a) h=0.5 T=0.8
g=0
g=1
g=2
g=3
A
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
∆
 
I P
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
b) h=0.5 T=0.8
g=0
g=1
g=2
g=3
Figure 6: (Color online) Variation of (a) ∆IX and (b) ∆IP with A for different values of squeezing parameter g, while values
of h and T are mentioned.
g
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
∆
 
I X
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
a) A=1.6 T=0.8
h=0
h=pi/4
h=pi/2
h=3pi/4
h=pi
g
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
∆
 
I P
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
b) A=1.6 T=0.8
h=0
h=pi/4
h=pi/2
h=3pi/4
h=pi
Figure 7: (Color online) The security of the scheme in terms of parameters (a) ∆IX and (b) ∆IP as a function of squeezing
parameters g and h. Linear amplifier gain A and transmission coefficient T of the beamsplitter are mentioned.
h
∆
 
I X
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 pi/2 pi 3pi/2 2pi
a) A=1.6 T=0.8
g=-3
g=-1
g=1
g=3
h
∆
 
I P
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 pi/2 pi 3pi/2 2pi
b) A=1.6 T=0.8
g=-3
g=-1
g=1
g=3
Figure 8: (Color online) Variation of (a) ∆IX and (b) ∆IP squeezing parameters g and h with the value of A and T as
mentioned.
8
denial of service) can be performed by Eve in which she blocks the second channel (i.e., from Alice to Bob) and prepares and
sends random quantum states to Bob, preventing Bob from receiving the message. This attack by Eve will be detected when
Bob performs the eavesdropping checking on the decoy states in the message mode. In another kind of attack strategy, Eve
measures the intercepted state, infers it, re-prepares it and sends it. This attack too, cannot be performed successfully by Eve
as the squeezing parameter sj and the initial amplitude αj are random and unknown at the time of measurement, and hence
no information can be obtained about the message sent. The same arguments hold for the CQD protocol.
4.3 Participant attack by Charlie
In CQD protocol, after Alice records her message and sends the encoded state to Bob. As Charlie is aware of the squeezing
parameter, so he may intercept the Alice-Bob channel and apply S† operator to find out Alice’s message. Subsequently, he
re-prepares and re-sends the state to Bob. To avoid this, Alice has to apply her own random squeezing operation S(wj) on the
state after encoding her message. Here, it may be noted that this attack is not applicable to the other scheme proposed here as
there is no supervisor in that scheme.
5 Conclusion
Motivated by the recent success of CV quantum key distribution schemes using Gaussian states, we proposed here a two-party
and a three-party CV direct secure Gaussian quantum communication schemes. Specifically, we have shown that a sender
can send CV information to a distant receiver (in the QSDC scheme) without distributing and encrypting it with a quantum
key to attain security ensured by the quantum resources. A single-mode squeezed state is used as a quantum resource, and
displacement and squeezing operations are used to encode the message, which is decoded by performing homodyne detection.
We have also proposed a CV CQD which allows two parties to perform simultaneous communication under the supervision
of a controller in a secure manner. The proposed scheme can be reduced to the corresponding three-party scheme where a
sender can send her message to the receiver by assuming that Bob is neither encoding his message nor announcing his
final measurement outcomes in our CQD protocol. Both these schemes are found useful as primitive to design solutions
for socioeconomic problems, and thus the feasibility of our scheme with single-mode Gaussian states enables us to provide
CV solutions for these problems. We have further established the application of our CQD scheme to provide solution of
socialist millionaire problem. Similarly, the proposed schemes can be used to obtain quantum solutions for e-commerce [34]
and voting [30] as well. Our CQD scheme can also be reduced to a modified version of recently proposed two-party quantum
dialogue [26] scheme in the limiting case, which will be more robust against Gaussian quantum cloning machine and intercept-
resend attacks as the squeezing parameter is not revealed in our scheme.
We conclude the paper with the expectation that in view of the recent surge of experimental direct secure quantum com-
munication and promising future of CV quantum communication, the present schemes be implemented in the near future.
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